(a) Authentication of warheads and components to establish that an item declared to be a nuclear warhead or a component from a nuclear warhead is consistent with those declarations

Later in 1998, other missile warhead fragments were sampled in Iraq.

Using a verification system employing a combination of non destructive assay sensors measuring many warhead attributes or templates,7 it has proved possible to discriminate between different types of warhead or component.

Work on dismantlement involved consideration of the processes associated with dismantling any particular warhead, recognizing that many of these could be specific to the warhead, although some were likely to be generic.

This film shows the testing of a new explosive fill on a warhead.

Each stage in a warhead production process has its particular effluents and signatures.

Degradation products of VX were found on missile warhead fragments by one national laboratory.

If the warhead remains largely intact on impact then it will represent a real hazard to civilians.

Even if the nuclear warhead broke the asteroid into many small pieces, they could have time to re combine into another large object. In addition, the space vehicle carrying the weapon might malfunction, and the nuclear warhead could land (and perhaps detonate) somewhere on Earth.

Verification evidence can be accumulated from measurements of these materials, supported by measurement of other (potentially warhead related) emissions.

The technologies employed in the production of a nuclear warhead are fundamentally the same as those found in many industrial environments.

If a guided missile crashes prior to arming, then the warhead may or may not experience an energetic reaction on impact.

(a) A site where one or more scientific or industrial activity, required to produce disassemble a nuclear warhead device is carried out plus

(b) Any other location where an unsafeguarded activity is carried out (and where the primary function is to serve the production, storage or disassembly of a nuclear warhead device).

Since there were no distinctive physical differences between chemical and biological warheads and inspectors were still unaware of any biological weaponization, the true nature of those warhead fragments was not investigated further.

At this stage, Iran still needs at least a year or longer to assemble one or two crude Hiroshima type bombs. The hardest part still lies ahead the miniaturization needed to fit a nuclear device into a warhead.

In that respect, the verification goal would be to provide independent confirmation of, inter alia, the size and disposition of the declared warhead stockpile, the production dismantlement rate of warheads and precursor components, plus inventories and movements of fissile material.

However, since the signature of a spoof cannot be determined in advance, a warhead authentication and dismantlement system would need to have as high a detection probability as possible (while minimizing the occurrence of false alarms) in order to detect spoofing.

Following Iraq's admission in 1995 of the weaponization of Al Hussein warheads with biological warfare agent and their later unilateral destruction in 1991, inspectors sampled warhead fragments and obtained samples found to be positive for the DNA of Bacillus anthracis.

India has deployed a nuclear triad bombers, missiles, and submarines and in 2012 tested an intercontinental ballistic missile, giving it the ability to hit Beijing and Shanghai. India almost certainly has a multiple warhead (known as a MIRV), in development, and has also launched satellites to aid its targeting of Pakistan s forces.

A significant conclusion from this work was that managed access could permit some form of access for non security cleared personnel into sensitive nuclear warhead facilities, but it identified the need to determine and manage the degree of access that can be given to inspectors without compromising defence and proliferation sensitive information.

We would also welcome indications from Russia and the United States of how the move to a warhead based accounting system and the inclusion of non strategic nuclear weapons (as envisaged in the START III framework), as well as the aim of strategic stability, are to be carried forward over the next five years.

1. Welcomes the commitment of the two countries to strategic nuclear warhead reductions in the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions ( the Moscow Treaty ), signed on 24 May 2002,See CD 1674. which is an important result of this new bilateral strategic relationship and which will help to establish more favourable conditions for actively promoting security and cooperation and enhancing international stability