The IAEA Board of Governors should consider a suspension of technical assistance for any members under investigation for such noncompliance.

Today, the Treaty is facing the most serious challenge in its history due to instances of noncompliance with its nonproliferation obligations.

Noncompliance threatens all parties and demands an effective response or there will be further erosion in security and in confidence in the NPT.

The Conference recalls the role of the UN Security Council when cases of nuclear proliferation, including noncompliance with Articles I or II, are brought to its attention.

The Conference underlines, in that regard, that facts indicating that the purpose of a particular activity is the acquisition of a nuclear weapon would suggest noncompliance with Article II.

The Conference considers that NPT parties should foster an attitude of zero tolerance for violations and make clear in advance a willingness to invoke promptly strong measures in response to any noncompliance.

It emphasizes that NPT parties have a right to expect the IAEA and the Board of Governors to conduct investigations of noncompliance not only fairly and objectively, but also vigorously, thoroughly, and promptly.

This Review Conference provides an opportunity for NPT States Parties to demonstrate resolve in reaffirming our collective determination that noncompliance with the Treaty's core nonproliferation norms is a clear threat to international peace and security.

The Conference encourages NPT parties to consider a wide range of responses to any noncompliance with the NPT and to take appropriate steps, including, but not limited to, a halt to nuclear cooperation with the offending state.

The Conferences urges the IAEA to act swiftly in conformity with its Statute to halt technical assistance and seek its return from any IAEA member that fails to remedy noncompliance with an IAEA safeguards agreement in a reasonable time period.

The Conference considers that the crisis of noncompliance by Treaty parties threatens the security of all nations, including through the potential for terrorists to exploit these violations in their own pursuit of nuclear material for a radiological device or nuclear weapon.

The Conference recognizes the need to persist in efforts to resolve ongoing cases of noncompliance, not only to remedy the security threat posed by these states, but also to demonstrate the international community's resolve and to deter others from following the violators' defiant behavior.

On the basis of the recommendations by the Committee, the Meeting of the High Contracting Parties set out in paragraph 3 of this Article may decide to those measures which it consider the most appropriate in the specific case, particularly in case of repeated or continued noncompliance.

Examples of activities indicative of noncompliance include clandestine facilities or procurement, willful IAEA safeguards violations, a pattern of deception and denial, and the pursuit of a nuclear program with no legitimate justification for peaceful purposes (e.g., the acquisition of enrichment or reprocessing facilities with no clear economic justification).