For Kim Kyong hui, this has meant overseeing proposals from the Korean Workers Party, the military, and the government. It has meant revising, supplementing, and ratifying other policies, as well as setting the KWP s general direction.

(c) Prospects towards a general prevention policy

National reunification policy of the Government of the Democratic People s Republic of Korea

There is a new policy to enable them to return to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with the promise of a pardon.

This opens up a new policy option for the West impelling North Korea to dial back its foreign and security policy by deepening its economic and social engagement with the rest of the world. The benefits for the North would drastically change the regime s strategic calculus, particularly concerning nuclear weapons.

The most urgent requirement for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula is an immediate end to the nuclear threat of the United States and its hostile policy towards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, aimed at overthrowing the regime.

There is a new policy to enable them to return to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with the promise of a pardon.

The DPRK's policy framework related to children is extremely comprehensive.

In order to improve the north south relations, the present south Korean authorities should, among other things, make an about face in policy by giving up the policy depending on foreign forces and exercising the policy of national independence.

Data on policy changes indicated that the overwhelming majority of changes had been in the direction of liberalization.

Following this spring s round of North Korean provocations, Xi appears to have concluded that enough is enough. As a result, China s North Korea policy has entered a new stage.

12. Mr. Manele (Solomon Islands) said that the integration of environmental and economic policy was difficult to achieve, but his Government was attempting to move in that direction.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's policy of Songun Jongchi which is to say, to give priority to military affairs is aimed primarily at coping with the attempts of the United States to suffocate the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which constitute a real threat.

It is a product of the hostile United States policy aimed at stifling the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

The nuclear issue is a product of the hostile policy of the United States towards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

But the big problem was that the North s leadership apparently interpreted China s policy as a sign of unwillingness to pressure the North on nuclear matters. Indeed, North Korean behavior became much more provocative, including an attack in 2010 that sank the South Korean corvette Cheonan and another in which the South s Yeonpyeong Island was shelled.

Indeed, the Bush administration s unilateral behavior, including the dismantling of the 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework with North Korea, the hyping of an enriched uranium deal, and the infamous axis of evil speech, have all increased the paranoia of an already paranoid regime. So former President Bush s foreign policy toward North Korea, especially during his first term in office, must take a fair share of responsibility for the present mess.

I still recall the difficulty that I faced, as South Korea s foreign minister, in convincing Bush administration policymakers to negotiate with North Korea instead of merely applying pressure and waiting for the North to capitulate. Back then, North Korea was restarting its Yongbyon nuclear facility and producing plutonium, thus strengthening its bargaining position vis à vis the US.

Today, thanks to our independent policy and the Songun policy, the dangers of war are being prevented and peace is being maintained on the Korean peninsula and throughout the region.

(iv) Orientation of wage policy towards a fairer distribution of the national product and of social security policy towards full coverage of situations of unemployment, disability and illness, dependency allowances and old age pensions.

China s interest in a new North Korea policy is not entirely new. After all, China s policy toward the country has been gradually moving in a more constructive direction for the past two decades, reflecting China s growing international prominence, as well as its leaders cautious embrace of the global role that their country s new economic might has provided.

More fundamentally, no one should think that North Korea s totalitarian communist system can be changed overnight. No one inside or outside can remove its anachronistic dynastic communist regime, and no outsider can hope to modify quickly the policy behavior of its fossilized military, party, and administrative bureaucrats.

As was stated on several occasions, the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula is the direct product of the hostile United States policy against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea extended over half a century.

This is attributable to the south Korean authorities which commit themselves to the policy depending on outside forces and take a confrontational stand against the north.

The world must develop a more carefully calibrated policy toward North Korea, one aimed at simultaneously implementing denuclearization and economic reform. The added benefit of such an approach is that it is far more likely to gain Chinese support than today s single minded focus on denuclearization.

But when the North Korean regime realized that smile diplomacy did not get it whatever it was they wanted, the country s rulers shifted back to hostility. This time, the authorities froze South Korean real estate in the Geumgang Mountain tourist zone and, most seriously of all, attacked the Cheonan.

The DPRK has a longstanding State policy of collectively supporting children's care, upbringing, education and overall socialization.

Japan fabricated the Ulsa Five Point Treaty in 1905 and Jongmi Seven Point Treaty in 1907 and enforced a colonial predatory policy in Korea for 41 years.

Immediately after the North s second nuclear test in 2009, Chinese officials undertook a review of their country s North Korea policy and decided to separate the nuclear issue from the overall bilateral relationship. Thus, former Prime Minister Wen Jiabao visited Pyongyang in October 2009 and promised generous economic aid.

Women had absolute trust in the social system and in the Government's benevolent policies and were making every effort to fulfil their role in developing and enriching the country.

Now they claim to have manufactured nuclear weapons for self defense. Although there had been several unofficial statements by Kim Jong Il s regime admitting that North Korea possessions nuclear arsenal, the announcement was the first official confirmation.

In particular, Chinese President Xi Jinping s position on North Korea s nuclear program is closer to America s than that of any of his predecessors. Given North Korea s economic dependence on China which accounts for some 90 of its trade nowadays it is critical to take advantage of this policy convergence.

Yet just waiting for North Korea to collapse is a regime change strategy by default and the cost of a chaotic or violent collapse could be frighteningly high. Indeed, the fear of this cost is what keeps China so passive where its North Korean client is concerned.

France, too, is now moving in this direction, creating individual activity accounts that aim to streamline its social policies, without sacrificing its sense of national solidarity.

In Japan, fear of North Korea s nuclear threat and anger over the abduction of Japanese citizens generates powerful political pressure against engagement. China is the one place that quietly implements a constructive economic engagement approach.

China is the one place that quietly implements a constructive economic engagement approach. Instead of pressing Beijing to cut off North Korea, the US and its allies should further develop their own efforts to draw North Korea out of its insularity.

If North Korea had reciprocated in a timely manner following US envoy William Perry s visit to Pyongyang in May 1999, President Bill Clinton s policy of engagement with the North might have been upgraded to a push for normalization of diplomatic relations. Instead, the North procrastinated, sending Vice Marshall Jo Myong rok to the US only in October 2000, near the end of Clinton s presidency.

Not long after President George W. Bush came into office, his administration took a hard line stance against the North Korean regime, calling for a review of the Clinton administration s policy, and eventually tagging North Korea as a member of the axis of evil. While North Korea had done much over the preceding years to warrant a more critical eye, in retrospect these policies set back prospects for peace and stability in the region.

But, though Bush maintained America s hard line toward Iran, in 2006 he changed tack in dealing with North Korea and began seeking a deal doubtless influenced by the North s first nuclear test, carried out in October of that year. An eventual agreement, reached in the fifth round of the six party talks in February 2007, could not be implemented because of North Korea s refusal to agree on a verification protocol.

All of that was grammar school stuff compared to efforts to decipher the regime in North Korea, where the truth is far more opaque.

His Government responded to goodwill in kind.

The fact that the United States has been maintaining economic sanction measures and related laws against the Democratic People s Republic of Korea for about five decades shows that it has no intention of giving up its policy of isolating and stifling the Democratic People s Republic of Korea.

As everyone knows, the nuclear issue is a direct product of the hostile policy of the United States against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea during more than half a century.

The OMT scheme s German opponents argue that it is unconstitutional, because it is not monetary policy, but fiscal policy aimed at financing insolvent and lethargic eurozone governments. They argue that it is not the ECB s job to rescue the euro or to prevent countries from exiting the monetary union.

What, then, does this imply with respect to North Korea? Given the Kim regime s past negotiating tactics, Obama is understandably reluctant to launch any new diplomatic initiative and may well believe that negotiating with North Korea would provide his domestic political opponents with ammunition to ruin his Iran deal.