Kurdish

shahr e Kord

Erdoğan s Kurdish Gambit

Kurdistan

Sounds like Kurdish. I don't understand it.

Syria s Kurdish Hope

A Referendum For Kurdistan?

San Miguel de Tucumán

On 12 June the inaugural session of the Kurdistan National Assembly elected Massoud Barzani to a four year term as President of the Kurdistan Regional Government.

The same profile has also appeared in the Kurdish media.

I would like to convey the greetings of the people of Iraqi Kurdistan, which is part of Iraq, to the Assembly.

The south and Kurdistan have been the regions least affected.

Based on an agreement between UNDP and the Kurdistan Regional Government, the latter arranged for the printing of 600,000 copies in Kurdish by 12 October, in addition to the 304,520 copies printed in Baghdad.

The fighting between the KDP and the PUK resulted in the flight of an estimated 65,000 PUK supporters from northern Iraq to the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Erdoğan s plan, however, depends on ending Turkey s 30 year conflict with its own Kurdish population. As a result, the Erdoğan government has decided on negotiations with Abdullah Ocalan, the jailed leader of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), the armed Kurdish resistance movement.

269. In addition, the Special Rapporteur received several reports regarding the killings of Kurds and Assyrians by Kurds in northern Iraq.

Mr. Hamid also printed 1,000 copies of a calendar showing a map of what purports to be Kurdistan, with the intention of distributing it among Kurdish students at Damascus University.

9. The member of Parliament and deputy for Diyarbakir, Ms. Leyla Zana, has been sentenced to a prison term of 15 years, upon the lifting of her parliamentary immunity, allegedly for having had contacts with members of the Kurdish Workers apos Party (PKK) and having propagated, in the Kurdish language in Parliament, a just solution for the Kurdish problem.

At its 1st meeting, the Commission elected the following officers by acclamation

The State party should take urgent steps to remedy the situation of statelessness of Kurds in Syria and to protect and promote the rights of non citizen Kurds.

(spoke in Kurdish English text provided by the delegation)

Kurds held fast to their own ethnic identity. Eventually, the suppression of the Kurdish language and culture fueled a brutal insurgency, led by the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) which has cost the country more than 30,000 lives.

Christians who have fled rebel controlled areas live peacefully and with equal rights in Kurdish areas. Indeed, these areas have become safe havens for all religious and ethnic groups escaping the war.

If his position on the Islamic State continues to waver, he will only alienate the Kurds further, which means that when the jihadists decide to encroach on Turkish territory, Turkey will have to confront them without a Kurdish alliance. But if he decides to support the Kurds in their fight against the Islamic State, he will undoubtedly enhance their national aspirations.

The judgment was said to be based on the reasoning that, since the group which was quot struggling for the independence of the Kurdish people quot was the Kurdish Workers apos Party (PKK), consequently, Aycin apos s statement demonstrated support for the PKK.

The Committee remains concerned at the situation of the large number of Kurds treated as aliens or unregistered persons and the discrimination experienced by them.

Every province in Iraq can now benefit from Kurdistan's experience.

Victims included Kurdish villagers, students, journalists and members of political parties.

The uncertainty this time around is attributable to the predominantly Kurdish Peoples Democratic Party (HDP). Kurdish political parties shied away from contesting past elections, owing to their fear of failing to clear the 10 popular vote threshold needed to enter the parliament.

Since the fall of Saddam Hussein, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in northern Iraq has effectively established de facto autonomy vis à vis the central government in Baghdad. Regional and domestic developments could push the Kurdish authorities in Erbil, their capital, toward declaring formal independence.

10. Contrary to the Special Rapporteur apos s allegations, his Government had not forcibly relocated Kurds or Turkomen in the areas of Kirkuk and Khanaqin.

Lastly, the reference to the end of the violence against the Kurds in 1999 was unclear but, as far as he knew, that had been the year in which the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) had collapsed following the capture of its leader.

West Azerbaijan, Khuzestan, Kermanshah, Kurdistan, Fars, Lorestan, Hormozgan and Bushehr.

This highlights another issue on which Turkey and the Islamic State converge the Kurds. Erdoğan seems to hope that, by degrading Kurdish military strength and territorial control, the Islamic State will help him to achieve his central goal of diminishing the Kurdish nationalist movement, which has long been a thorn in Turkey s side.

The Working Group was informed about the situation of the Turkmen minority in Iraq, including in areas controlled by Kurds.

Turkey accuses Iraqi Kurds of harboring between 3,000 and 3,500 of Turkey s most active Kurdish militants the PKK separatist guerillas who are blamed for the deaths of 80 Turkish soldiers so far this year. The trouble reached the boiling point on October 7, when Kurdish fighters killed 13 Turkish soldiers near Turkey s border with Iraq.

Nor is it clear that the West is capable of compensating the Kurds with full fledged statehood. The geostrategic constraints that have prevented Kurdish independence for centuries are even more acute today.

Lastly, it should explain why the Turkish Constitution did not recognize the Kurds as a special minority, a fact that frequently posed difficulties for the Kurdish people, in particular women.

The Kawa Association for Kurdish Culture (KAKC), based in Iraq, reported on the seminars organized to promote understanding between Kurds, Arabs, Turkmen and Assyrians.

Allegedly, these sentences related to Dr. Besikci apos s research on census data of ethnic Kurds in Turkey and on his defence of the idea of an independent State of Kurdistan .

Moreover, the chances that Iraqi Kurdistan will achieve de facto or de jure independence are greater than ever. Iraq s Kurds may even be able to extend their influence into Kurdish populated northern Syria, thereby becoming a more influential regional player than the Iraqi government in Baghdad.

At the same time, the Turkish government is pursuing a separate path of negotiations, through a rapprochement with another Kurdish authority the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in northern Iraq. The grand vision is to integrate Iraqi Kurdistan into the Turkish economy.

The protest spread over three consecutive days, with violent demonstrations being held in the provinces of Badakhshan, Konar, Vardak, Lowgar, Gardez and Badghis.

From Turkey s perspective, a confederation of Syria s northeastern region with the KRG might be favorable to continuing domestic Kurdish unrest, much less rule by the anti Turkish Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) along its border with Syria. In contrast, any attempt by the KRG to establish a Kurdish corridor to the Mediterranean would certainly meet resistance, not only from Turkey, but also from other warring factions in Syria.

Confronted with the debacle in the rest of (Arab) Iraq, the question has to be asked why the US led coalition should not hold a referendum in the Kurdish region, asking the population how they would like to be ruled. After all, the Kurds have, by any internationally accepted standards, a right to self determination.